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I. Executive Summary 
 
South Carolina’s Statewide Procurement System (SPS) has a low risk for fraud.  This is important because a 
significant portion of the State’s $24 billion budget is executed through the SPS annually.  This review provides 
the public an understanding and an appropriate level of assurance of the fraud risk when the State spends 
taxpayer funds.  Additionally, this review provides a firm foundation for the Budget and Control Board (BCB) 
and agencies oversight when deploying finite audit resources in providing assurance testing of the SPS. 
 
A procurement fraud risk assessment is designed to collect multiple data sets from as many optics as practical to 
understand the risk of fraud in a complex procurement system.  This review’s sources included procurement 
officer interviews; continuous audit results of the SPS by the Procurement Services Division (PSD), BCB; 
review of vendor protests and appeals to the PSD and the Procurement Review Panel (PRP); actual cases of 
procurement fraud in State government; confidential surveys to procurement officers, internal auditors, and 
vendors; and a high level comparison of the SPS to best practices.   
   
The quantitative data, also known as the hard numbers, developed in this review are supportive of a low risk 
fraud environment.  Actual procurement frauds in State government were extremely low—fiscal year (FY) 
2013-2014 had four incidents for a total loss of $425,700, of which one incident amounted to $415,000.  
Review of procurement protest and appeals to the PSD and PRP demonstrated near zero were based on integrity 
or fairness issues.  The survey results of the procurement officers and internal auditors showed the number of 
fraud incidents observed, as opposed to suspected, over the past three years were 3% and 12%, respectively.  
The internal auditor’s 12% observed fraud was concerning; further analysis of their narrative comments 
revealed single events, often involving the use of low dollar purchase card (P-card) transactions.  With 1000 
surveys submitted to vendors, only five requested interviews, and those described only suspected individual 
frauds and not observed or systemic frauds. 
 
The qualitative data from both procurement officer interviews and confidential surveys paint a picture of a high 
integrity SPS environment.  The SIG’s interviews of 17 procurement officers demonstrated a highly 
professional, committed group with a keen understanding of maintaining SPS integrity.  Most telling was their 
ethical standards typically resembling a “no cup of coffee” rule and managing relationships to avoid even 
appearances of impropriety, which were much more restrictive than State ethics laws demand.  The internal 
auditor’s survey results were positive in most areas, but certainly audit skepticism was healthy and present in 
their responses which should be heeded.  Just because the incidents of fraud were low does not mean the risk 
and unreported incidents couldn’t be higher. 
 
Throughout all the interviews and surveys, no one raised an issue of a pattern or systemic fraud scheme.  Fraud 
will occur in $5 billion of annual SPS transactions, but the fraud data was so disproportionately low that it was 
indicative of a low risk of fraud in the SPS.  The issue closest to an unhealthy pattern involved the use of sole 
source (FY12-13: $127,612,720) and emergency (FY12-13: $32,356,612) procurement methods.  Virtually 
every data source flagged these two procurement methods as high risk and the BCB continuous audits confirms 
a pattern of non-compliance.  Non-compliance with established internal controls does not necessarily equate to 
fraud, but it is certainly the breeding ground for fraud and waste.  This pattern needs to be reversed.            
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 Realizing with over 100 agencies in the Executive Branch operating the SPS, there will be a bell curve of risk 
for fraud in each agency.  But overall, the data is clear—the State’s SPS has a low risk of fraud.    
 
The SIG lays much of the credit with the State’s foresight in developing a robust procurement system modeled 
with best practices, as well as the PSD’s “personal touch” providing leadership, guidance, and direction to the 
over 100 Executive Branch agencies.  PSD has successfully created a statewide procurement system with esprit 
de corps despite operating in a highly decentralized agency environment.     
 
Regardless of the SPS’s low risk of fraud, there are opportunities to consider for improvement.  A wise person 
once said, “If you are not going forward, you are going backwards.”  Areas to consider incremental 
improvement include: 
 
• Develop mitigation controls for the top tier identified fraud risks:  sole source; emergency procurement; 
information technology; and indefinite delivery contracts.   
   
• Place the SIG’s confidential hotline number on key standard procurement documents to facilitate SPS 
participants in reporting fraud, which likely will provide a more significant impact of deterring fraud 
based on the existence of an easy, confidential reporting mechanism.   
 
• Adding additional capacity in the PSD, particularly in training and standardization of a statewide 
procurement manual, would leverage the capabilities of procurement officers in agencies, which would 
improve effectiveness and lower fraud risk. 
   
• Agencies could modify their respective codes of conduct for all employees to incorporate the current 
informal higher standards used by procurement officers, such as no gifts and avoiding even the 
appearance of impropriety or conflict of interest standards. 
    
• Conduct periodic fraud risk assessment surveys. 
 
• Periodically provide fraud awareness training. 
 
It is rare to conduct a review where the data so heavily leans in one direction leading to a convincing and 
positive conclusion—the State’s SPS has a low risk for fraud.     
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II. Background 
 
A. Objectives 
 
This review was self-initiated by the State Inspector General (SIG) based on several factors.  The SPS is the 
single function of state government woven into all agencies with the design to ensure effective use of taxpayer 
funds, to include preventing waste and fraud.  This review provides the public an understanding and the 
appropriate level of assurance of the fraud risk in the SPS.  Additionally, this review provides a firm foundation 
for the BCB and agencies oversight when deploying finite audit resources in providing assurance testing in the 
SPS.      
 
This review’s objectives were: 
 
• Interview a cross section of procurement officers and the PSD to obtain their subject matter expertise 
and experience on fraud in the SPS; 
• Survey SPS participants, primarily procurement officers, agency internal auditors, and vendors, on fraud 
risk in the SPS, while also providing confidentiality;   
• Review records to discern indicators of fraud, to include PSD audits of agencies’ procurement 
operations, participant protests of solicitations or awards, and actual frauds conducted in the SPS during 
the recent fiscal year;  
• Map the SPS processes to analytically identify areas of risk for fraud; and   
• Most importantly, improve the procurement processes by identifying and mitigating fraud risks to deter 
and prevent fraud in a function of government that annually spends billions of taxpayer dollars.  
    
B. Overview of the Statewide Procurement System 
 
The PSD provides the State's central procurement operation for all State agencies covered by the South Carolina 
Consolidated Procurement Code (Procurement Code).   The PSD has three primary functions:  serves as a 
procurement subject matter expert providing guidance, advice, and training to facilitate state agencies 
procurement operations; delegates authority to individual agencies to make direct purchases below a certain 
dollar threshold based on capabilities; and assumes responsibility for agency purchases above each respective 
agency’s delegated dollar limit threshold authority. 
 
The purposes of the Procurement Code are: (a) to provide increased economy in state procurement activities and 
to maximize purchasing dollars while ensuring that procurements are the most advantageous to the State and in 
compliance with the provisions of the Ethics laws (b) to foster broad-based competition for public procurement 
within the free enterprise system; (c) to develop procurement capability responsive to user needs; (d) to 
consolidate, clarify, and modernize the law governing  procurements in this State and permit the continued 
development of explicit and thoroughly considered procurement policies and practices; (e) to require the 
adoption of competitive procurement laws and practices by units of state and local governments; (f) to ensure 
the fair and equitable treatment of all persons who deal with the procurement system which will promote 
increased public confidence in the procedures followed in public procurement; (g) to provide safeguards for the 
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 persons engaged in the public procurement process; and (h) to develop an efficient and effective means of 
delegating roles and responsibilities to the various government procurement officers.  
Normally, each agency has a procurement officer who manages procurement functions and ensures that the 
Procurement Code regulations are followed.  Contracts can be initiated by the agency or PSD on behalf of the 
agency.  
 
Generally, the SPS process takes the following steps:  
• An agency need is identified; 
• A solicitation is written and published in the South Carolina Business Opportunities (SCBO) newsletter 
with the exception of small purchases less than $2,500 ($10,000 for higher education institutions); 
• A competition is held (vendor responses judged responsive, vendors judged responsible, and bids or 
proposals are evaluated); 
• A vendor is awarded the procurement; and  
• A contract is negotiated and executed. 
The State implemented an enterprise-wide software to manage its business operations, the South Carolina 
Enterprise Information System (SCEIS).  Except for the State's colleges and universities, all State agencies 
utilize SCEIS for their business operations.    
 
Procurements are conducted utilizing 17 different methods, which, to simplify understanding, can be 
categorized into the following framework: 
 
Primary Types of Procurements 
  
Small Purchases: Procedures on procurements up to $50,000: 
 
1. Purchases not in excess of $2,500:  non-competitive process; purchaser attests purchase price is “fair and 
reasonable;” 
2. Greater than $2,500 to $10,000:  solicitation of written quotes from a minimum of three vendors with 
the award made to the lowest responsive and responsible source; 
3. Greater than $10,000 to $50,000:  written solicitation that must be publically advertised requesting 
written quotes, bids or proposals, with the award made to the lowest responsive and responsible source; 
 
Greater than $50,000:  a publically advertised, competitive process is required that may be accomplished by 
using one of five different methods depending on the commodity solicited and the method most advantageous to 
the State:   
 
4. Competitive fixed priced:  a process resulting in awards to multiple vendors who agree to the state’s 
maximum contract price; 
5. Competitive on-line bidding (reverse auction):  award to low bidder using e-procurement system with 
deadline for real-time bidding; 
6. Competitive sealed bid:  award to low bidder meeting the published specifications and contractual terms 
and conditions; 
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 7. Competitive best value bidding:  a method to allow other factors besides price to be considered in an 
award where price may be weighted no less than 60%;  
8. Request for Proposals (RFP):  a method used where other factors are considered more important to the 
State than price, which may not be a factor – offers are scored on the stated criteria and an award is 
made to the highest scoring offeror following negotiations;    
 
Specialized Types of Procurements 
  
9. Sole source procurements:  award to one vendor determined to be the only source; 
10. Emergency procurements:  an award made under conditions of a threat to public health, welfare, 
efficiency or safety where normal procurement procedures cannot be followed; 
11. Information technology (IT):  awards made for IT needs required to be procured by the Information 
Technology Management Office; 
12. Construction Services: Unique procedures applicable to the complexities of construction, such as 
design-build and bid-build contracts; 
13. Indefinite delivery contracts (IDC): competitive award establishing vendor contract to provide 
construction or design services to be used for a limited period of time and a limited total expenditure; 
14. Statewide term contracts:  award to bidders who meet requirements to maximize the buying power of all 
agencies on routine products and services; 
15. Qualification based selection:  non-competitive process; award based on qualifications for professional 
design services with fees less than $25,000; 
16. Auction or bankruptcy sale:  unique procedures applicable when the state disposes of bankruptcy 
property; and 
17. Exempt services & commodities:  General Assembly statutory exemptions of procurements "exempted" 
from the Procurement Code. 
  
The SPS also provides an avenue to protest if a solicitation is restrictive or the process is unfair, which is a 
quality control to reinforce the SPS’s commitment to fair and equitable treatment and promote public 
confidence.  The initial protests are in writing directed to the appropriate Chief Procurement Officer (CPO) 
responsible for construction, information technology, or supplies & services.  Participants then have a right to 
appeal a CPO’s decision to the PRP, which is a separate state agency composed of a panel of non-state 
employees with subject matter expertise selected by the Governor.   
This framework of the SPS provides only an overview.  The thrust of the State’s SPS follows the fundamentals 
of public procurement:  promotes openness, fairness, and transparency for public scrutiny, all to prevent fraud, 
collusion, or unjust favoritism; insure equal opportunity to compete; secure the public benefits of full and open 
competition; provide flexibility to accommodate complex purchases; and provide for efficiency and economy in 
the expenditure of public funds.  Ideally, the SPS’s processes strive to operate by balancing the need for fiscal 
accountability with the needs of agencies and vendors for user friendly processes to improve timeliness and 
save costs from missed opportunities or administrative overhead.  The temptation to trigger all possible 
safeguards must be tempered to find that balance point of the appropriate level of safeguards while maintaining 
an efficient and effective SPS to meet its procurement mission.     
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C. Overview of Fiscal Year 2012-2013 Procurements 
 
The State’s most recent complete FY budget, 2013-2014, was approximately $24 billion.  Tallying up the exact 
expenditures conducted by the SPS is somewhat complicated because not all agencies use SCEIS and a few 
other idiosyncratic factors, such as, the Department of Transportation uses the federal procurement standards.  
However, in a conservative estimate, the SPS handles at least $5 billion annually.  In FY 2012-2013, the State 
executed in excess of $19 billion in SPS contracts (the life of the contracts vary from one to five years).   
  
III. Record Review 
 
A. State Procurement Services Division Audits of Agencies 
 
PSD’s Audit and Certification Office (ACO) continuously audits state agencies’ procurement transactions, 
averaging eight audits annually, designed to evaluate the system of internal controls over procurement.  The 
objective is to provide management with reasonable, but not absolute, assurance of the integrity of the 
procurement processes. 
 
During FY 2012-2013, ACO audited eight agencies’ procurements that included review of $153,628,541 of 
reported sole source procurements; $7,374,301 of reported emergency procurements; 24,367 procurement card 
transactions; transactions involving 82 construction contracts; and transactions associated with 34 IDCs.   
ACO’s testing methodology includes, but is not limited to, testing selected transactions from the general ledger 
accounts maintained on SCEIS to the agencies’ supporting justification maintained for validity and 
appropriateness in compliance with the Procurement Code; quarterly reporting of emergency, sole source and 
unauthorized procurements to the BCB; ratifications of applicable transactions; accurate reporting of 
procurement transactions; circumvention of the Procurement Code/splitting of orders; favoritism of vendors; 
proper approvals obtained; IT purchases are in compliance with the agency IT Plan; IDC and construction 
contract payments for compliance with the State Engineer’s Office procedures and the Procurement Code; 
properly reporting surplus property; and review of questionable procurements.  
 
During the most recent fiscal year, ACO had 237 findings.  Of these 237 findings, 142 were technical non-
compliance issues such as no Drug-Free Workplace certifications (115); inappropriate use of exemptions (2); no 
written certification for grant exemptions (4); and no single transaction limit established for P-card transactions 
(2).  
 
The residual 95 findings were considered more significant substantive non-compliance to include inappropriate 
sole source procurements (50); inappropriate emergency procurements or insufficient documentation to support 
emergency determinations (29); no proof of competition (14); and unauthorized procurements (2).  The SPS’s 
processes were designed to protect both the vendors and the state, but in these instances, non-compliance 
creates the potential for fraud, waste, and abuse.  Of particular note are the sole source and emergency 
procurement method findings because both appear to be a recurring pattern.  Given this pattern and the large 
amount of dollars in FY 2012-2013 sole source ($127,612,720) and emergency procurements ($32,356,612), 
this pattern of non-compliance is an unhealthy sign and is inconsistent with the SPS to promote competition to 
lower costs and mitigate fraud or even the appearance of impropriety.  Although these substantive non-
compliance findings did not detect integrity or fraud issues, it does not mean there was none and certainly the 
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 risk of fraud, waste, and abuse is heightened when these types of procurement methods are, intentionally or 
unintentionally, circumvented.     
 
The most telling fact impacting the fraud risk assessment is that ACO did not detect even one instance of fraud 
during its review of agency procurements over the past five years.  This continuous audit model serves as a 
deterrent, and its results are indicative of a low fraud risk environment and provides confidence that the 
procurement processes are being properly maintained by the agencies in compliance with the Procurement 
Code.  
  
B. Analysis of State Procurement Protest Processes 
 
The SPS includes provisions for participants, primarily vendors, to protest procurement process actions or 
decisions.  A mechanism for protests adds a quality control to reinforce the SPS’s commitment to fair and 
equitable treatment and promote public confidence.  The initial protests are directed to the appropriate CPO 
responsible either for construction, information technology, or supplies & services.  Participants then have a 
right to appeal a CPO’s decision to the PRP.    
 
1. Protests to the Chief Procurement Officer 
 
The SIG reviewed 48 recent protests to the CPO.  Forty seven protests (98%) did not raise any fairness or 
integrity issues.  These generally pertained to technical issues with bids or the appropriate application of 
procurement code processes.  However, one protest raised a fairness issue, which, based on file documentation, 
warranted further review by the SIG.   SIG field interviews and further record reviews determined the initial 
concerns of unfairness did not have merit.   
 
2. Appeals to the Procurement Review Panel 
 
Protests denied by a CPO can be appealed to the PRP.  The SIG reviewed the 19 protests appealed to the PRP 
during FY 2011-2012 and FY 2012-2013.  Eighteen protests (95%) did not raise any fairness or integrity issues; 
these generally pertained to technical issues with bids or the appropriate application of procurement code 
processes.  However, one protest raised a fairness issue that was effectively addressed by the CPO in a 
judgment to re-solicit the bid, and upheld by the PRP. 
 
C. Procurement Frauds Conducted in Fiscal Year 2013-2014 
The SIG produces an annual report on fraud conducted by Executive Branch employees.  The most recent FY 
2013-2014 reporting identified four procurement frauds totaling $425,700.  All four involved the misuse of P- 
cards, which allowed the P-card holder to make non-competitive purchases under a $2,500 threshold.  Two 
frauds were nominal in nature averaging several hundred dollars, but the remaining two were significant with 
losses of $10,000 and $415,000.  Both of these frauds were conducted by front-line employees converting P-
card purchases to personal use.  In both cases, adequate SPS internal controls were in place, to include the 
requirement of supervisory review and approval of monthly P-card statements.  The problem was lack of 
appropriate supervisory oversight in executing the established internal controls.   
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 The most illustrative “lessons learned” were gleaned from examining the $415,000 fraud.  This scheme 
occurred over a period of six years with the front-line employee exploiting two significant gaps in the agency’s 
financial control environment.  First, the supervisor was insufficiently engaged in the work of a subordinate to 
understand the basis for the fraudulent purchases or just not paying attention when approving the subject’s 
monthly P-card bills.  Second, the best practice of separating the end user, the subject, from the actual purchaser 
was not followed.  The subject was issued a P-card for convenience rather than need.  Assigning a P-card to an 
end user who is operating independently in a remote location or making frequent low dollar amount purchases 
in the field is reasonable; but in this case, the subject was buying expensive computer components while 
stationed at the agency’s headquarters.  Failure of both of these basic financial controls provided the subject the 
opportunity to develop multiple fraud schemes, to include submitting fraudulent invoices for fictitious 
companies; over-purchasing items and selling the excess inventory; and the theft and resale of existing 
inventory. 
 
IV. Procurement Officers’ Interviews 
 
Seventeen procurement officers from 12 agencies and PSD staff were interviewed with structured interview 
questions (see Appendix D).  The interviewees demonstrated a highly professional, committed group with a 
keen understanding of maintaining SPS integrity.  Most telling was their ethical standards typically resembling 
“no cup of coffee” rules and managing relationships to avoid even appearances of impropriety, which were 
much more restrictive than State ethics laws demand.   
 
Universally, the procurement officers attested to the high integrity environment within the SPS.  Almost as 
universal was their respect and appreciation for the PSD’s leadership, guidance, and direction to agencies.  
Despite well developed, standardized procurement processes, procurement officers still make many judgments 
on a case by case basis requiring these agencies to seek input from the deep experienced pool of procurement 
officers at the PSD.  Access and the responsiveness of these PSD subject matter experts seems to be key to 
making the entire SPS operate effectively.   
 
Individual issues with sufficient frequency impacting fraud risk were identified and presented below: 
 
• The highest risk issue noted by the large majority of the procurement officers was the need to maintain a 
properly staffed and experienced central procurement office.   The agencies were very positive 
concerning the assistance and guidance provided to them by the PSD, but were concerned with the 
turnover/attrition within the office and the loss of such institutional knowledge.  While this is not 
necessarily a fraud issue, the procurement officers rely so heavily on PSD that any erosion to its 
capabilities impacts field agencies.  Additionally, if overall SPS capabilities erode due to lack of central 
expertise and training, it could certainly increase the fraud risk.   
 
• Thirteen (76%) of the 17 procurement officers indicated the need for fraud awareness training.  Only 
one agency indicated they have instituted fraud training internally and developed a fraud policy. 
  
• Three (18%) of the 17 procurement officers indicated that justification for panel evaluator’s scores were 
not always maintained with the file, which, for a RFP contract award determination, is expressly 
required.  
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 • Three (18%) of the 17 procurement officers indicated concerns that the risk of sole source 
determinations in many cases did not meet the criteria of a true sole sourced vendor, and competition 
was not solicited, which subsequently increased the cost to the state.  As stated in the Procurement Code, 
“in cases of reasonable doubt, competition should be solicited.”   
 
• Three (18%) of the 17 procurement officers indicated concern for risk of abuse of inappropriate 
purchases or fraud relative to P-card transactions, and noted instances of occurrences in the past.  
However, the issue is not more controls, but actually adherence to current controls, such as supervisory 
oversight, would limit the opportunity for fraudulent activity. 
  
• One (6%) agency indicated that Statewide term contracts were being used to circumvent the 
procurement bidding process.  This has potential for abuse, hiring specific vendors based on personal 
relationships, rather than competitively bidding the job for the most qualified vendor.  Another 
interviewee described a new pattern where agencies use the Statewide IT contract for projects that 
should require a competitive bid process.  This seems to be occurring because agencies may not have the 
skill set to establish an IT scope of work in a competitive bid process.  An IT competitively bid contract 
can protect an agency from non-performance, while the use of the statewide contract inhibits 
establishing firm deliverables, thus exposing an agency to little recourse for underperformance.     
 
• The Procurement Code and the ensuing State regulations stipulate that all governmental bodies will 
develop an internal Procurement Procedures Manual.  Agencies interviewed reported that each one 
developed their own internal procurement manual.  The procurement manuals for these 12 agencies 
ranged from 3 pages to 219 pages.  These manuals and procedures are used to provide guidelines for 
agency personnel involved in the procurement processes and to facilitate the agency's certification.  PSD 
does not have a model procedures manual for agencies, which may be a cost/effective opportunity to 
support both operational effectiveness and training, particularly in smaller agencies.      
 
• Seven (41%) of the 17 procurement officers indicated there is a significant need for enhanced training to 
ensure the people that work in procurement have the proper training, and that training should be 
routinely provided without cost.  Procurement officers indicated that many of the classes were cancelled 
by PSD and not rescheduled. Training is imperative to those that are assigned as the agencies’ 
procurement officers, to ensure they have the knowledge and skills to adequately conduct the 
procurement processes of the agency.  
 
V. Surveys of Statewide Procurement Process Participants 
 
After gaining a full understanding of the SPS from record reviews and procurement officer interviews, the SIG 
developed a confidential survey instrument for all procurement officers and internal auditors in agencies, as 
well as a sample from the vendor community.  Survey response data from each population is as follows: 
 
• procurement officers:  71 of 100 surveyed responded; 71% response rate; 
• internal auditors:  50 of 160 surveyed responded; 31 % response rate; and 
• vendors:  43 of 1000 surveyed responded; 4% response rate.    
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 The survey and corresponding results for the procurement officers, internal auditors, and vendors are contained 
in Appendices A, B, and C, respectively.  This section of the report will summarize and analyze the survey 
results.  The analysis will be grouped into the following categories:  integrity; management’s response to fraud; 
fraud observations & risk by procurement method (the 17 procurement methods in the background section, page 
6); fraud observations & risk by type of fraud; procurement processes; agency audit capabilities to deter fraud; 
and improvement opportunities to mitigate fraud.    
 
To simplify the summary, the majority of survey questions are known as “agree/disagree” questions where a 
statement is made with five possible responses:  strongly agree; agree; disagree; strongly disagree; and 
uncertain.     
 
A. Procurement Officers 
 
Integrity 
 
The survey included the following four “agree/disagree” questions pertaining to employee and SPS’s process 
integrity: 
 
• The State’s procurement processes are designed to prevent fraud, collusion, or unjust favoritism in the 
award of public contracts.   
• My agency operates within the State procurement guidelines with fairness. 
• The employees charged with the responsibility to conduct the procurement processes operate with 
integrity.   
• My agency has adequate controls in place that would reasonably prevent the occurrence of fraud. 
 
The aggregate results were 99.5% agreed/strongly agreed; 0% disagreed/strongly disagreed; and less than 1% 
were uncertain.   
  
Management’s Response to Fraud 
 
A key control to lower fraud risk is the “tone” management sets.  The survey had two “agree/disagree” 
questions pertaining to management’s response to fraud: 
 
• Suspected fraud or corruption is appropriately addressed by agency management. 
• Suspected fraud or corruption is appropriately referred to law enforcement by agency management. 
 
The aggregate results were 89% agreed/strongly agreed; 1% disagreed/strongly disagreed; and 10% were 
uncertain.    
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 • In the five types of fraud (vendor collusion; employee/vendor collusion; relationship corruption; 
employee fraud; and vendor fraud), the aggregate results when asked to rate the risk (likelihood & 
impact) of each type of fraud were:  37% low; 16% moderate; 10% high; and 37% uncertain.  Again, 
uncertain seems high. 
       
• Two vendor questions showed the actual number of “observed” fraud; one was 9% and the other was 
5%.  This was less than internal auditors (12%) and greater than procurement officers (3%).  The SIG 
interviewed all vendors requesting an interview—five.  All five described past State procurements where 
each suspected some level of fraud.  What was interesting, all five described a particular transaction of 
suspected fraud and not an observed fraud or systemic fraud within the SPS.     
 
Throughout the review, the SIG recognized the management adage of “process protects,” which equates to clear 
rules, standardization, and monitoring promotes confidence and assurance in achieving appropriate, or fair, 
outcomes.  But even within this rigorous SPS process, procurement officers have built in flexibility to exercise 
judgment in making determinations at various stages of the process.  It is these areas that seem to draw 
interviewee or survey respondents’ suspicions which does not infer there is anything improper, just an event 
that is driven by judgment rather than a rote process.    
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
The measurement of any process, results in quantitative data and qualitative data, which then must be 
synthesized into judgments and conclusions, and then hopefully into recommendations to improve in a 
pragmatic matter.  The SIG presents its data in a robust manner to allow readers to filter the data through their 
own experiences leading to their own judgments, conclusions, and recommendations.  Still, it is incumbent 
upon the SIG to provide its analysis to this voluminous data. 
 
The SIG’s analysis starts with looking from a high level on all its data sources, which hopefully measured the 
SPS from multiple optics for a fair analysis.  The sources included procurement officer interviews; PSD’s 
continuous audit results of the SPS; review of vendor protests to PSD and appeals to the PRP; actual reported 
procurement fraud in state government; surveys to procurement officers, internal auditors, and vendors; and a 
high level comparison of the SPS to best practices.   
 
The SIG’s analytical foundation begins with assessing quantitative data composed of “hard numbers,” and then 
brings qualitative data to bear.  In this case, the review of actual procurement frauds in State government was 
extremely low given the billions of dollars executed by the SPS—FY 2013-2014 included four events for a total 
loss of $425,700, with one incident at $415,000.  Review of PSD and PRP activity demonstrated near zero 
appeals based on integrity or fairness issues.  The survey results of the procurement officers and internal 
auditors showed the number of fraud incidents observed, as opposed to suspected, over the past three years were 
3% and 12%, respectively.  The internal auditor’s 12% observed fraud was concerning, but further analysis of 
their narrative comments revealed only single events, often involving the use of low dollar P-card transactions.  
With 1000 surveys sent to vendors, only five requested interviews, and they described suspected individual 
fraud incidents, but not any systemic or observed fraud.  The quantitative results are consistent with a low risk 
of fraud.   
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 The qualitative data from both procurement officer interviews and confidential surveys paints a picture of a high 
integrity SPS environment.  The SIG’s personal interviews with 17 procurement officers demonstrated a highly 
professional, committed group with high integrity.  The internal auditors’ survey results were positive in most 
areas, but certainly audit skepticism was healthy and present in their responses which should be heeded.  Just 
because the incidents of fraud are low does not mean the risk and unreported incidents couldn’t be higher. 
 
Throughout all the interviews and surveys, no one raised an issue of a pattern or systemic fraud scheme.  Fraud 
will occur in $5 billion of annual SPS transactions, but the fraud data was so disproportionately low that it was 
indicative of a low risk of fraud in the SPS.  The issue closest to an unhealthy pattern involved the use of sole 
source (FY12-13: $127,612,720) and emergency (FY12-13: $32,356,612) procurement methods.  Virtually 
every data source flagged these two procurement methods as high risk and the BCB continuous audits confirms 
a pattern of non-compliance.  Non-compliance with established internal controls does not necessarily equate to 
fraud, but it is certainly the breeding ground for fraud and waste.  This pattern needs to be reversed.            
 
Realizing with over 100 agencies in the Executive Branch operating the SPS, there will be a bell curve of risk 
for fraud in each agency.  But overall, the data is clear—the State’s SPS has a low risk of fraud.   
 
Regardless of the SPS’s low risk of fraud, there are opportunities for improvement.  A wise person once said, 
“If you are not going forward, you are going backwards.”  The SIG has set forth recommendations below to be 
considered by both individual agencies and PSD as ideas for incremental improvement.         
 
VII. Findings & Recommendations 
 
Finding #1:  Based on data collected, the SPS has a low risk for fraud. 
 
Finding #2:  The PSD is highly effective in its mission and sustaining an SPS with a low risk for fraud. 
 
Recommendation #2:  Even in a tight resource environment, resource enhancements to the PSD have a 
significant leveraging impact to facilitate the 100 Executive Branch agencies to improve their 
production and capabilities, particularly resources for training and possibly standardization of a 
statewide procurement manual baseline.   
 
Finding #3:  The wide variety of data sources clearly rated the following procurement methods as the top tier 
fraud risks:  sole source; emergency procurement; information technology; and indefinite delivery contracts.   
   
Recommendation #3a:  The PSD should consider additional cost/effective controls to mitigate the 
perceived higher risks in these procurement methods. 
 
Recommendation #3b:  Individual agencies should consider examining these higher risk procurement 
methods unique to their agency, and consider cost/effective mitigation strategies.   
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 Finding #4:  Establish a procurement fraud hotline is a cost/effective mechanism to deter and identify fraud. 
 
Recommendation #4:  The PSD should consider placing the SIG’s confidential hotline number on key 
standard procurement documents to encourage SPS participants to report fraud, which likely will 
provide a more significant impact of deterring fraud based on an easy, confidential reporting 
mechanism.   
 
Finding #5:   A cost effective fraud mitigation tool would be for agencies to modify their respective codes of 
conduct for all employees to incorporate the current higher informal standards used by procurement officers, 
such as no gifts and avoiding even the appearance of impropriety or conflict of interest standards.    
 
 Recommendation #5:  Agencies should consider modifying the respective codes of conduct. 
 
Finding #6:   A cost effective fraud mitigation tool for the statewide SPS would be to conduct periodic fraud 
risk assessment surveys. 
 
Recommendation #6:  The SIG will collaborate with PSD on an appropriate frequency for a fraud risk 
assessment survey and execute this task.   
 
Finding #7:  A cost effective fraud mitigation tool would be providing fraud awareness training. 
 
 Recommendation #7:  The SIG will collaborate with PSD on developing a fraud awareness program.  
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